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Formation of Fiscal Policy:
The Experience of the Past 
Twenty-Five Years
Introduction
he Congressional Budget Act, passed in 1974, established 
new procedures for the budget process itself, and created 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide information 
needed by Congress to carry out this process. The quarter 
century since then has witnessed repeated changes in the rules 
governing the budget process, in response to economic 
changes as well as to the perceived performance of the budget 
process itself.
With fiscal affairs apparently in order—at least in the short 
run—and with some perspective on the past twenty-five years’ 
economic performance, we are in a position to ask how well the 
budget process has worked to produce a coherent and 
responsive fiscal policy, particularly given the important 
changes in the U.S. economy over the period.
It is with these economic changes that I begin in the next 
section, discussing the consequences for tax and expenditure 
policies. I then turn to a more complete discussion of how the 
state of the federal budget has changed over the past twenty-
five years. Next, I discuss how these changes in the budget have 
led to changes in budget procedures, and what impact these 
changes in the budget process have had. Finally, I review where 
we are, and how well the short-term budget surplus reflects the 
longer run state of U.S. fiscal policy.
The Economy, Then and Now
Since the mid-1970s, several changes in the economy have 
altered the landscape of fiscal policy.
The Rise and Fall of Inflation
Just a few years after President Nixon’s ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to moderate inflation through the imposition of price 
controls, the first OPEC oil shock drove the inflation rate up to 
around 9 percent during the 1974-75 period, as measured by 
the GDP deflator. Although it fell somewhat during the years 
immediately following, the inflation rate was already on the rise 
when the second oil shock hit in 1979 and it rose to about 
9 percent again in 1980 and 1981. Based on the consumer price 
index, inflation was several percentage points higher.
The rapid inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s had 
significant impacts on the federal budget and, ultimately, tax 
and expenditure policies. First, it led to a surge in federal income 
tax revenues, as “bracket creep” drove individuals into higher 
tax brackets, and the real values of the personal exemption and 
standard deduction fell. Based on simulations using annual tax 
return files, Auerbach and Feenberg (1999) calculate that the 
average marginal individual tax rate rose from .21 in 1975 to .27 
in 1981, just before the Reagan tax cut was introduced—a 
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period over which there was no significant legislation increasing 
marginal tax rates. Indeed, the average marginal tax rate was 
higher in 1981 than in any other year for which calculations 
were made, spanning the 1962-95 period, from before the 
Kennedy-Johnson tax rate reductions of 1964 to after the 
Clinton tax rate increases of 1993. The Economic Recovery Tax 
Act (ERTA) of 1981, which substantially reduced marginal tax 
rates and then provided for bracket indexing beginning in 1985, 
may thus be traced to the inflation of the preceding years. In a 
sense, then, the deficits of the 1980s may be attributed in part 
to the inflation of the 1970s.1
A second major impact of inflation occurred within the 
Social Security System, via the calculation of benefits. Prior to 
the 1970s, benefits were not explicitly indexed, but were 
increased regularly to account for rises in the cost of living. 
This changed in 1972, but the initial indexing method was 
flawed and resulted in real benefit increases. By the time this 
mistake was corrected in 1977, retirees had seen a substantial 
increase in their real benefits, and those in the succeeding 
cohort—whose benefits were gradually phased back to 
intended levels—became the infamous “notch babies,” 
deprived of the full windfall given earlier generations. This 
unintended expansion of Social Security benefits helped 
contribute to the funding crisis of the early 1980s, and led to the 
1983 Greenspan Commission. The commission’s 
recommendations resulted in increases in the payroll tax rate 
and base that have brought us the massive “off-budget” cash-
flow Social Security surpluses of the 1990s (Chart 1).
This curious notion of budget items that are off-budget 
highlights the issue of proper budget measurement, for which 
the inflation of the 1970s was also relevant. With the federal 
budget being measured in nominal terms, the inflation-
induced erosion of the national debt during the late 1970s was 
excluded from deficit calculations. Had such erosion been 
counted, the “massive” deficits of the late 1970s would have 
been much smaller. Indeed, how to measure the budget deficit, 
and the deficit’s usefulness as a measure of fiscal policy 
sustainability, has become central in the recent confusion over 
the appropriate response to short-term surpluses.
The “Demise” of the Business Cycle
The United States was in the midst of a serious recession in 
1974. Two more recessions followed within the next decade. 
However, over the seventeen-year period since the end of 1982, 
the U.S. economy has spent just eight months in recession, 
during the relatively mild one of 1990-91. The sustained growth 
over this period, particularly the expansion in the 1990s, has 
contributed to the decline in budget deficits experienced.
Shifts in the Distribution of Income
Since the late 1970s, the distribution of income in the United 
States has become less equal. A substantial literature has arisen 
to explain the sources of this trend, and the exact magnitude of 
the trend itself depends on the years chosen for comparison 
and the measure of income used. But there is no doubt that the 
change has occurred and that it is large.
Table 1 presents recent Congressional Budget Office 
estimates of the changes in average real pretax family income 
by quintile over the 1977-99 period. The table also provides 
measures for subgroups of the top quintile. Over the full 
twenty-two-year period, real incomes fell in the bottom three 
quintiles, rose slightly in the fourth quintile, and jumped in the 
top quintile, rising faster still for higher income groups within 
the top quintile.
The rise in the share of income going to those facing higher 
marginal tax rates has driven individual income tax collections 
to unprecedented levels. As a share of GDP, federal tax 
collections have risen sharply in recent years, to 20.5 percent in 
fiscal year 1998 and an estimated 20.6 percent in fiscal year 
1999—the highest share since 1944 and the highest peacetime 
share ever. While trends since the 1970s are complex, essentially 
all of the recent rise in this fraction is attributable to the 
individual income tax. From 1994 to 1999—a period during 
which the only important tax legislation was the tax cut 
included in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act—federal taxes as a 
share of GDP rose from 18.4 percent to 20.6 percent, while 
individual income taxes rose from 7.9 percent to 10.0 percent.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 11
Some of this rising tax share is attributable simply to the 
progressivity of the individual income tax, as real incomes in 
all quintiles rose during the mid- and late 1990s. Even with 
indexing for inflation, taxes as a share of income should rise 
as taxpayers’ incomes face higher marginal tax rates—a 
consequence traditionally referred to as the “fiscal dividend.” 
In Auerbach and Feenberg (1999), we calculate that the 
elasticity of individual income taxes with respect to real 
income is approximately 1.67, an historically high value for 
the United States. With average real pretax family income 
rising by 12.2 percent between 1993 and 1999 (Table 1), this 
elasticity predicts that individual income tax revenues should 
have grown by 12.2 x 1.67 = 20.4 percent, or from 7.9 percent 
of GDP to 8.5 percent of GDP. This is less than one-third the 
actual rise. The rest of the increase is attributable to the rising 
share of income going to high-income individuals, and to the 
increase in capital gains realizations (which are not included 
in GDP) fueled by the recent stock market boom.
The shifting income distribution has contributed to the 
improved health of the federal budget. But it has also 
influenced the character of tax legislation, which has made 
distributional consequences a more central concern. The 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 reduced marginal tax rates 
across the board, and hence provided the greatest absolute and 
relative benefits to those in higher tax brackets. By contrast, the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised marginal 
tax rates only on a very small group within the top few percent 
of the income distribution by introducing two new marginal 
tax brackets.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented something of a 
midpoint in this evolution. It sought to maintain rough 
balance in the relative individual tax burdens across income 
classes, raising taxes on capital income—the type of income 
most concentrated at the top—to offset the substantial 
reduction in top marginal tax rates. In doing so, it made use of 
an unfortunate tax policy innovation—the “phase-out”—that 
has come to plague our tax system in the years since. In that 
particular instance, the most significant phase-out (with 
respect to adjusted gross income) applied to eligibility for 
deductible contributions to individual retirement accounts.2 
But subsequent legislation has caused these phase-outs to 
proliferate, applying them to itemized deductions and personal 
exemptions in 1990 and adding such items as the child credit, 
HOPE scholarships, and the Roth IRAs in 1997. Thus, unlike 
those in 1993, the tax increases in 1997 on high-income 
taxpayers occurred not through explicit rate increases, but 
through a denial of tax benefits through the use of phase-outs. 
While phase-outs were with us before 1986 (applied, for 
example, to the Earned Income Tax Credit), they have now 
become so prominent that, as of 1998, fully 25 percent of 
individual taxpayers were in effective marginal income tax 
brackets other than their official ones (U.S. Joint Committee 
on Taxation 1998, Table 3).
It is not entirely clear why the process of raising taxes on 
higher income groups has taken the form of phase-outs, 
although its lack of transparency appears to provide some 
political benefit (and hence some comfort to those opposed to 
“new” taxes). But this political advantage has come at the cost 
of considerable complication of the tax system, with its welter 
of phase-out ranges producing a marginal rate schedule that 
some have compared with the New York City skyline 
(Furchtgott-Roth and Hassett 1997). How to achieve “urban 
renewal” is as daunting a task in this context as in the original.
The Aging Baby-Boomers
The baby-boom generation, born between the mid-1940s and 
the mid-1960s, is still in its preretirement period, but its 
coming retirement has loomed more and more prominently in 
fiscal policy decisions made over the past quarter century. Most 
evident among the fiscal policy actions taken was the initiation 
in the 1980s of the pattern of trust fund accumulations 
depicted in Chart 1. In 1998, the accumulations accounted 
for 1.2 percent of GDP; the CBO projects them to grow to 
1.8 percent of GDP by 2009 (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
1999c). Over the coming years, the Social Security System 
projects the ratio of covered workers per beneficiary to drop 
Table 1
Average Real Pretax Family Income
Percentage Change
Category 1977 1993 1999 1977-99 1993-99
Lowest quintile $10,000 $ 7,800 $ 8,400 -16.0 7.7
Second quintile 23,700 19,600 21,200 -10.5 8.2
Middle quintile 36,400 32,300 35,400 -2.7 9.6
Fourth quintile 49,300 49,000 53,000 7.5 8.2
Highest quintile 94,300 114,000 132,000 40.0 15.8
All families 42,900 44,100 49,500 15.4 12.2
Top 10 percent 125,000 158,000 188,000 50.4 19.0
Top 5 percent 166,000 225,000 276,000 66.3 22.7
Top 1 percent 356,000 584,000 719,000 102.0 23.1
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1999c, Table 1).
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Chart 2
Federal Medicare and Medicaid Spending
from its current value of 3.4 to 2.5 by 2020 and to 2.0 by 2035 
(Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds 1999, Table II.F19). These 
accumulations have been viewed as necessary to help cushion 
the impact of the coming adverse demographic change. 
However, the most recent Social Security Trustees Report 
projects that the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
Trust Fund will vanish in 2034, at a time when the system’s 
benefit payments will greatly exceed its income.
The Growth in Spending on Medical Care
The anticipated rapid increase in Social Security benefits poses 
a future problem with implications for current budget policy. 
By contrast, government medical spending—the other major 
component of federal entitlements—is very much a “current” 
problem, not having waited for the baby-boom generation to 
retire. Along with aggregate U.S. public and private spending 
on medical care, which now accounts for about 14 percent of 
GDP, Medicare and Medicaid have grown very rapidly since 
their introduction in the mid-1960s. As Chart 2 illustrates, 
these programs together grew from 1.1 percent of GDP in 
fiscal year 1974 to 3.8 percent in fiscal year 1998. At present, 
the three largest entitlement programs—Medicare, Medicaid, 
and Social Security—account for more than three-quarters of 
all entitlement spending and nearly half of the federal budget, 
excluding interest.
Summary 
The U.S. economy has made the transition from high inflation, 
but not before prompting the indexation of its individual 
income tax and public retirement systems and a major income 
tax reduction. The economy’s favorable performance has 
helped improve the budget situation, but so have the tax 
revenues generated by the widening income distribution, 
which has also contributed to a shift in the character of tax 
legislation. Tax cuts for high-income taxpayers have given way 
to tax increases, but the increases have often taken an indirect 
form. An aging population presents a challenge for the years to 
come, and measures taken by the Social Security System to 
provide for this have been a major component of the recent 
shift toward budget surpluses. Medicare and Medicaid 
spending already has increased sharply, in advance of the 
further increases that will come with an aging population.
Changes in the Budget 
and Its Components
The federal budget situation has also changed markedly over 
the past twenty-five years. The rise and fall in deficits alone, 
though remarkable, masks important transitions that have 
occurred on the tax and expenditure sides of the budget. 
From Deficits to Big Deficits to Surpluses
Chart 3 shows the federal budget surplus, as a percentage of 
GDP, since 1974. Superimposed on the chart for comparison is 
the full-employment, or “standardized,” surplus, as calculated 
by the CBO. Based on the examination of these two series, it is 
useful to distinguish three periods. During the first, through 
fiscal year 1981, the full-employment deficit stayed relatively 
stable, at between 2 and 3 percent of GDP. The second period 
was one of deficit expansion, beginning with the recession of 
1982 and compounded in the years that followed by the trend 
in the underlying full-employment surplus itself. Since 1986, 
the full-employment and actual deficits have shrunk steadily, 
except during the recession of 1990-91 and the slow initial 
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Composition of Federal Revenue, 1974-98
Fiscal year
Payroll
The Shift in Spending
As noted, Chart 2 illustrates the shift to spending on health care 
that has occurred since 1974. Chart 4 shows the growth in 
overall entitlement spending, which was more modest over the 
period, as a result of a fall in spending on entitlement programs 
other than Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Indeed, 
spending on these three programs has risen from just over half 
of all entitlement spending in 1974 to nearly three-fourths of all 
entitlement spending at present. Still, 1974 was the last year in 
which discretionary spending exceeded aggregate entitlement 
spending. Since then, discretionary spending as a share of GDP 
has fallen, from around 10 percent until the mid-1980s to about 
two-thirds of that fraction today. The cuts in nondefense 
discretionary spending that helped finance the defense build-
up in the 1980s were sustained in the 1990s even as defense 
spending fell sharply.
The Rise in Individual Income 
and Payroll Taxes
Since 1974, the individual income tax and the payroll tax have 
grown to account for more than 80 percent of all federal 
revenue (Chart 5). The payroll tax has grown steadily with the 
size of the Social Security System. The individual income tax 
has experienced two periods of sustained growth, both 
associated with the economic changes discussed above. The 
first was the bracket creep of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
before the tax system was indexed. The second, the recent 
growth spurt, is primarily the result of a shift in the distribution 
of income during the 1990s. In between, the tax cuts of the early 
Reagan years are quite apparent. These tax cuts also affected 
corporate tax collections.
Summary
Since 1974, the federal budget deficit has risen and fallen while 
revenues have come more from income and payroll taxes, and 
expenditures have shifted away from discretionary spending 
and toward entitlements. Within entitlements, expenditures 
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and away from other programs. Much of these changes are 
attributable to the economic forces discussed above. But there 
have also been significant policy initiatives during the past 
quarter century, with respect both to the levels of spending and 
revenues and to the manner in which these levels are 
determined. The next section offers a closer look at policy 
during the period.
Major Elements of Fiscal Policy, 
1974-99
Since 1974, there have been several major pieces of tax 
legislation and several changes in regime with respect to the 
determination of expenditures and the reconciliation of 
revenue and expenditure totals. Charts 6 and 7 present 
estimates of the effects of these policy changes—based on 
contemporaneous Congressional Budget Office projections—
covering most of the period, from just before fiscal year 1982 to 
the present. Before considering the charts, some discussion of 
the underlying data will be helpful.
For many years, the CBO has provided frequent updates of 
its baseline revenue and expenditure forecasts for the federal 
budget, covering the current fiscal year and several—until 
recently, five—future fiscal years. With each update, the CBO 
allocates changes in forecast revenues and expenditures to 
legislative or policy actions on the one hand, and economic 
factors on the other hand (which it breaks down further into 
“economic”—macroeconomic—and “technical” sources).3 
The series graphed in Charts 6 and 7 are these projected policy 
changes, scaled by the appropriate year’s GDP and organized 
by the fiscal year in which the changes were recorded. For each 
date in the charts, the projected changes for the current fiscal 
year and five subsequent fiscal years are presented. For 
example, changes recorded by CBO documents during fiscal 
year 1999 would be grouped together, presenting estimated 
changes to the current fiscal year’s budget and those of the next 
five fiscal years.
As the CBO typically publishes an update of its Economic 
and Budget Outlook during the summer, near the end of each 
fiscal year, the changes in the charts will correspond roughly to 
the policy changes adopted during that fiscal year. An 
important exception to this timing convention occurs during 
the 1981-84 period, when the CBO’s updates were less 
frequent. In particular, there were no updates providing 
breakdowns of budget changes in the summer of 1982 or in the 
summer of 1983. Hence, the changes listed for 1982 in the 
charts correspond to all those occurring between July 1981 and 
February 1983, or roughly all of fiscal year 1982 and half of 
fiscal year 1983. The changes listed for 1984 correspond to all 
those occurring between February 1983 and August 1984, or 
roughly half of fiscal year 1983 and all of fiscal year 1984. With 
their layout established, we turn now to the charts.
Tax Policy
Even a quick look at Chart 6 indicates that something very 
important and atypical for the period occurred in fiscal year 
1982. Just before that fiscal year (and just after the previous 
CBO forecast), Congress enacted and President Reagan signed 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act, which included among its 
most important provisions a phased reduction in marginal tax 
rates and substantial accelerated depreciation incentives for 
businesses. What is all the more remarkable is that the changes 
shown in Chart 6 for fiscal year 1982 are net of the offsetting 
effects of that year’s Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(TEFRA), which raised taxes substantially. At the time, the 
CBO estimated that ERTA had reduced fiscal year 1986 
revenues by $205 billion—27 percent of that year’s baseline 
revenues in February 1983, 4.7 percent of that fiscal year’s 
GDP, and an amount nearly as large as that fiscal year’s budget 
deficit of $221 billion. While other factors contributed to the 
deficit, it is clear that the 1981 tax cut played a big role. It is also 
clear from Chart 6 that no changes since then have reached a 
similar magnitude, and that nearly all have been in the opposite 
direction. Other than TEFRA, the largest of the tax increases 
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with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984; the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93), which raised marginal 
tax rates and uncapped the Medicare payroll tax; and OBRA90, 
which introduced luxury excise taxes and the phase-out of 
itemized deductions and personal exemptions.
The period since 1993 is notable both for its quietude—the 
tax cuts contained in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 were 
insignificant relative to GDP, when compared with the 
previous tax changes—and its drift toward lower taxes. Most 
other changes during the period were also tax reductions, albeit 
very small ones.
The remaining important piece of tax legislation during the 
period, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, does not stand out in 
Chart 6 because that legislation by design was aimed at 
maintaining revenues at their previous level by raising the tax 
base and lowering marginal tax rates simultaneously.
In summary, it seems evident that tax policy—after the 
tax cuts made in 1981—was driven at least in part by the 
contemporaneous movement in the federal budget deficit over 
the period. A simple regression confirms what appears to the 
naked eye. The equation considered is given in the first column 
of Table 2. It is estimated over the period 1984-99 and has as its 
dependent variable the sum (over the current and subsequent 
five fiscal years) of that year’s legislated tax changes relative to 
GDP. I use this variable rather than the changes for the current 
or some other specific fiscal year because the time pattern of 
changes differs somewhat over time. The equation’s 
independent variable is the previous year’s budget deficit, 
also relative to GDP. The estimated coefficient is 0.33, with a 
t-statistic of 2.11. That is, the cumulative impact of each year’s 
legislated changes over a six-year budget window equals 
33 percent of the previous fiscal year’s deficit.
An alternative specification, given in the table’s second 
column, substitutes the lagged change in the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio. This specification, which fits slightly better, indicates that 
policy acts to offset 70 percent of any deficit increases with 
revenue changes. To gauge this magnitude, remember that the 
policy changes include those over six years, although they often 
do not begin until the subsequent fiscal year. Thus, the 
permanent reduction in revenues would be around one-fifth or 
one-sixth as large as the cumulative change used as dependent 
variable. This implies that perhaps 12 to 15 percent of a rise in 
the deficit is immediately undone by revenue policy changes.
The third column of Table 2 adds to the list of independent 
variables the cyclical GDP gap, equal to the percent deviation of 
actual GDP from the CBO’s estimate of potential GDP. This 
variable, which is positive when the economy is operating 
below capacity, has a coefficient with the “wrong” sign, in that 
it suggests that a rise in the output gap leads to tax increases. 
While it is doubtful that the government has actually chosen to 
follow a pro-cyclical tax policy, this coefficient reflects the fact 
that the largest tax increases occurred in fiscal years in which 
the economy was either in recession (1990) or was not fully 
recovered from a recent recession (1984, 1993). During the 
Table 2
Response to Deficits and the State of the Economy, 1984-99 
Dependent Variables
Revenues Expenditures Expenditures Less Revenues










































































Adjusted R2 .19 .26 .27 .09 .14 .08 .19 .26 .21













Expenditure Policy Revisions as a Share of GDP
recent period of strong economic performance, however, tax 
legislation has tended toward reduced revenues.
In all, revenue as a share of GDP has actually risen since 
1974, from 18.3 percent of GDP to 20.5 percent in 1998. 
However, as of 1994, after the most recent legislative tax 
increase, the share stood at 18.4 percent, virtually the same as 
that of 1974. Hence, the recent increase is not directly 
attributable to changes in tax policy. The succession of tax cuts 
and tax increases has left the federal income tax with a less 
progressive rate structure, with the top marginal rate declining 
from 70 percent prior to the 1981 tax cut to a statutory 
maximum of 39.6 percent at present.
Expenditure Policy
It is much more difficult to summarize the evolution of 
expenditure policy over the past quarter century. First of 
all, the expenditure side of the budget is much more 
heterogeneous than the tax side. As discussed, the composition 
of expenditures changed markedly over the period, with a shift 
to Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security from all other parts 
of the budget. Indeed, the rapid growth in these areas had little 
to do with actual policy changes. Second, changes in 
expenditure policy typically have involved not simply changes 
in program rules, but rather changes in future spending targets, 
with the ultimate details left to be worked out later and the 
feasibility of eventually meeting the targets uncertain. As a 
result, the timing of the actual policy changes is ambiguous. 
Should we count the changes when the determination was 
made—as we actually do—or when (and if) the changes were 
successfully implemented?
With this cautionary preamble, we may now turn to 
consider the history of expenditure policy changes since 1982, 
shown in Chart 7. The chart follows the same approach as 
Chart 6 did with revenue changes. Whereas the major post-
1981 revenue changes all represented tax increases, most of the 
changes in expenditure policy during this period have been 
toward decreasing expenditures. The one important exception 
was in fiscal year 1982, when out-year expenditures were 
projected to rise as a result of the combined impact of the 
defense build-up and the increased debt service due to that 
year’s large tax cut, despite large cuts in nondefense programs.
The four largest policy reductions in expenditures, relative 
to GDP, occurred in fiscal years 1986, 1991, 1997, and 1993, in 
decreasing order of importance. The first represents the 
establishment of deficit targets—and automatic spending cuts, 
should those targets be missed—by the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act, the initial Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings (GRH) bill, passed in late 1985. The second reduction 
corresponds to the late-1990 passage of the Budget Enforcement 
Act. This act jettisoned the GRH approach and replaced it with 
limits, or “caps,” on discretionary spending, along with the 
requirement that any new measures to increase entitlement 
spending or reduce taxes had to be offset, during the five-year 
“budget window,” by offsetting entitlement cuts or tax 
increases. The remaining two reductions came with the 1993 
and 1997 extensions of the Budget Enforcement Act, with the 
establishment of new discretionary spending caps. Thus, all of 
the period’s major legislative reductions in spending have 
coincided with the adoption or amendment of budget 
procedures.
Like revenue changes, expenditure changes have occurred in 
times of large deficits. The middle three columns of Table 2 
repeat the exercise just considered for revenues, relating 
cumulative changes in spending to the lagged deficit, lagged 
change in deficit, and lagged GDP gap. These results suggest 
that the spending response to deficits has been larger than the 
revenue response, although this response is estimated less 
precisely. Unlike revenue policy, expenditure policy has been 
countercyclical, but the estimated effect is very weak. The final 
three columns of Table 2 repeat the previous regressions, with 
expenditures less revenues as the dependent variable. Again 
adjusting the coefficient to account for the fact that the 
cumulative changes in revenues and expenditures include 
those of five or six years, this implies a total policy response that 
offsets 30 to 40 percent of deficit changes. 
In summary, U.S. fiscal policy on both the revenue and 
spending sides of the budget has been responsive to the 
fluctuations in the deficit in recent years, after the period’s 
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Have Budget Rules Worked?
The unified budget deficit that stood at nearly 6 percent of 
GDP in the early 1980s has disappeared, at least for the 
moment. What role did the various budget restrictions 
introduced during the period play in effecting this change?
One might count the measures as successful, based on the 
reductions in the deficit that followed the GRH legislation in 
1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act in 1990. But how can we 
distinguish this hypothesis from the alternative one that 
Congress intended to change its behavior, and that the 
succession of budget rules simply coincided with these changes, 
exerting no additional impact? Or, perhaps these two episodes 
were simply fortuitous coincidence. Research conducted at the 
state level—considering the impact of alternative, longstanding 
budget restrictions on fiscal policy (for example, Poterba 
[1997])—has generally found that such restrictions do have an 
impact. But unlike the situation at the state level, we have only 
one federal government; we cannot compare policy rules across 
different regimes at a given time. Over time, we can make no 
claim that the budget rule changes have been “exogenous,” and 
so we cannot necessarily attribute subsequent changes in taxes 
and spending to the changes in regime. For example, 
discretionary spending has, indeed, declined very rapidly as a 
share of GDP since 1991, following the introduction of 
discretionary spending targets (Chart 4). But this coincided 
with the decline in defense spending after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.
Perhaps the best evidence that the budget rules have worked 
lies in the instances in which they have failed, when legislators 
have sought ways around them. Had the restrictions simply 
ratified planned policy actions, then no such “end runs” would 
have been needed. During the GRH period, when annual 
deficit targets were set, there appears to have been a significant 
reliance on “one-time” savings such as asset sales (Reischauer 
1990), and the timing of deficit-reduction polices appeared to 
be skewed more heavily toward first-year changes (Auerbach 
1994). More recently, during the Budget Enforcement Act 
period, discretionary spending caps have been associated with 
an expansion of “emergency” spending not subject to the caps. 
In fiscal year 1999, authorized emergency spending reached 
$34.4 billion (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1999b). At 
least some of this spending—for such items as farm price 
support, Y2K computer conversion, and drug interdiction 
activity—is not consistent with the uninitiated observer’s 
conception of emergencies. Other initiatives that might have 
been introduced as discretionary spending programs, such as 
the HOPE scholarships contained in the 1997 tax bill, have 
appeared as tax expenditures instead.
But if these responses indicate that budget rules have had an 
impact, they also are likely to have introduced economic 
distortions. Using the tax code as an alternative to proscribed 
increases in discretionary spending appears to have greatly 
complicated the tax system, particularly in combination with 
the various income phase-outs used to limit the access to new 
tax expenditures by higher income households.
Ultimately, budget rules that are too much at odds with 
underlying legislative preferences do not last, as evidenced by 
the repeal of GRH in 1990, when it was clear that upcoming 
deficit targets would be missed and, perhaps, at present, when 
the looming discretionary spending caps appear unreasonable 
to many.
It is also important to recognize that policy changes are 
responsible for only a portion of the recent improvement in the 
deficit. The impact of legislation during the 1993-99 period is 
shown in Chart 8, which starts with the January 1993 surplus 
forecasts and adds to them the cumulative estimated effects of 
policy changes that have occurred since then. As late as 1996, 
these changes explain a significant part of the improvement 
over the original forecast. However, since 1997, a growing part 
of the improvement must be attributed to other factors. 
Indeed, by 1999, more than all of the improvement from the 
original forecast must be explained by factors other than policy 
changes, because the policy changes since January 1994 (when 
the initial forecast for fiscal year 1999 was reported) have been 
estimated to reduce the budget surplus. This gap is much larger 
than would be associated with normal cyclical variation. For 
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estimated by the CBO to have pushed the surplus $71 billion 
above its standardized, or “full-employment,” deficit of 
$1 billion. Yet the surplus was $298 billion higher than what 
was forecast in January 1993, even after account had been taken 
of the $129 billion attributable to deficit-reduction policy.
What other factors might be at work? First, the view of what 
constitutes full employment has shifted, as unemployment 
rates substantially below 5 percent have now been sustained for 
a long period without any significant rise in the inflation rate. 
Thus, even though the economy is still deemed to be “above” 
its full-employment level of output, that level itself has risen; 
that is, a larger share of the current surplus would be attributed 
to cyclical factors using the 1993 view of full employment. 
However, the CBO estimate of the natural rate of 
unemployment embodied in its estimate of the standardized 
employment surplus actually has not fallen much since 1993, 
only from 5.8 percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1998 (U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office 1999a).
If one applies an Okun’s Law coefficient of 2 to translate this 
into 0.4 percent higher implied real GDP and assumes that 
revenues increase roughly in the same proportion, this implies 
that revenues are now about 0.4 percent higher—and the 
standardized employment deficit is smaller by the same 
amount—because of the estimated drop in the natural rate of 
unemployment. But with revenues of about $1.8 trillion, this is 
barely $7 billion a year—quite small an amount relative to the 
recent improvement in revenues.
The remaining share of the increased surplus has come in 
large part from the surge in federal tax revenue and its 
components, already discussed above.
Where Do We Stand Today?
As we consider the current state of fiscal policy, reflecting on 
the success of budget rules and other factors in reducing the 
deficits of the past two and a half decades, we may ask what the 
current state of fiscal policy is. Do the rising surpluses and high 
ratio of revenues to GDP represent sufficient grounds for fiscal 
leniency? Unfortunately, these trends are misleading, for a 
number of reasons.
Forecast Uncertainty
Chart 9 presents the federal budget surplus since fiscal year 
1974, along with the most recently published (July 1999) CBO 
projections for the fiscal years through 2009, indicating that 
increases in the surplus are projected to continue. But the chart 
also presents two earlier sets of CBO projections of future 
deficits, one from July 1981 and the other from January 1993. 
As discussed, the 1993 projection turned out to be too 
pessimistic, even controlling for policy changes that occurred 
thereafter. Very much the opposite was true in 1981, when the 
subsequent tax cuts were compounded by much lower levels of 
GDP and tax revenue than had been predicted. Over this entire 
period, budget forecasting has proved very challenging, and 
errors have been quite large in absolute value relative to the 
totals being projected (Auerbach 1999). Thus, the very 
uncertain nature of the forecasting process means that we 
cannot be confident that surpluses in the range of current 
projections will be realized.
Optimistic Policy Assumptions
The surplus projections for the next decade reflect current 
policy. But current policy incorporates the discretionary budget 
caps, updated most recently in 1997. By fiscal year 2009, this 
would leave discretionary spending at just 5.0 percent of GDP. 
These assumptions may be unrealistic, a point brought home 
by the recent surge in “emergency” discretionary spending.
From an historical perspective, the levels of discretionary 
spending projected are nearly unprecedented. For example, 
suppose that international spending (currently 0.2 percent of 
GDP) was eliminated entirely and that the remaining 
components of discretionary spending—defense and domestic 
nondefense spending—were each allocated 2.5 percent of GDP 
in 2009. For domestic spending, this would be the lowest FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 19
percentage since 1962. For defense, it would be the lowest 
percentage since before World War II.
Yet changing the discretionary spending trajectory to one 
reflecting perhaps more realistic spending levels would have 
huge effects on future budget outcomes. Table 3, taken from 
Auerbach and Gale (1999), reports the results of making 
alternative assumptions about changes in discretionary 
spending over the next decade, accounting not only for the 
direct effect of the change in discretionary outlays but also for 
the associated change in debt service.5 Holding discretionary 
spending at its current level of GDP—that is, sustaining the 
reductions of the past two decades but going no further—
would cost more than $1.3 trillion over the next ten years. Just 
holding discretionary spending constant in real terms from 
1999 to 2009 would cost $556 billion relative to baseline.
The Limited Meaning of the Unified Budget
Chart 10 repeats the surplus projections for the decade 1999-
2009 from Chart 9, along with two modified versions of the 
surplus. The first alternative is the “on-budget” surplus that 
excludes accumulations of the Social Security trust fund.6 
These trust fund accumulations are currently running at about 
1.2 percent of GDP and are projected to rise to 1.8 percent of 
GDP by 2009. While much has been made of the appropriate 
treatment of the Social Security surplus, far less attention has 
been paid to the fact that the on-budget surplus still contains 
the accumulations of other trust funds—those of Medicare 
Part A (HI), and the civilian and military retirement systems. 
Any argument for excluding the Social Security surplus applies 
to these trust fund accumulations as well, and excluding them 
from the on-budget surplus yields the final series in Chart 10. 
This “modified” on-budget surplus actually becomes positive 
only in fiscal year 2002.
Many argue that it is misleading to include the Social 
Security surplus in the overall budget surplus calculation, 
because this surplus is being intentionally accumulated for the 
purpose of paying future Social Security benefits, an associated 
implicit liability that is not included in the overall budget. 
However, following this logic, one should not exclude Social 
Security trust funds from the accounting, but rather should 
include the associated liabilities that are accruing—liabilities 
that exceed trust fund accumulations. It is only through such a 
comprehensive approach that one can make sense of the 
coexistence of a budget “surplus” and a Social Security “crisis” 
at the same time. This issue is even more relevant for Medicare, 
expenditures on which are projected to grow much more 
rapidly over time than those on Social Security because of the 
continued rise in medical expenditures per capita.
If one looks at the long-run budget picture, rather than that 
of the current year or the near term, even taking the current 
projections as given, then there is no surplus.
Using long-run CBO projections through 2070, and the 
assumption that tax and spending aggregates maintain their 
2070 ratios to GDP thereafter, Auerbach and Gale (1999) 
update the calculations presented in Auerbach (1994) to solve 
for the permanent “fiscal gap.” This gap is defined as the size of 
the permanent increase in taxes or reductions in noninterest 















excluding other trust funds
Fiscal year
03 04 06 08
Table 3




Spending in 2009 
Cost Relative to 
Baselinea












  constant 5.43 566
Maintain
  percentage
  of GDP
Maintain
  percentage
  of GDP 6.49 1,343
Source: Auerbach and Gale (1999).
aIncludes added debt service costs to higher outstanding public debt.20 Formation of Fiscal Policy
required to satisfy the constraint that the current national debt 
equals the present value of future primary surpluses. The 
hypothetical change, denoted  , satisfies the equation:
,
where B1999 is the current value of the national debt, r is the 
government’s nominal discount rate, GDP  is the level of 
nominal GDP in year s, and  is the primary surplus in year s 
absent the change in policy. The government constraint in the 
equation is implied by the assumption that the debt-to-GDP 
ratio cannot grow forever without bound. It would also follow 
from the assumption that the debt-to-GDP ratio eventually (that 
is, as time s approaches infinity) converges to its current value.7, 8
Table 4, taken from Auerbach and Gale (1999), reports 
estimates of long-run fiscal gaps under different scenarios. The 
first row reports the gap under baseline assumptions, with no 
change in policy. The 1.30 percent figure in this row means that 
a permanent and immediate tax increase or spending cut of 
1.3 percent of GDP would be required to maintain long-term 
fiscal balance—roughly $120 billion at current GDP levels. 
That estimate, however, depends crucially on the assumption 
that real discretionary spending is reduced as projected in the 
budget forecast. If discretionary spending was held constant at 
its 1999 level relative to GDP, the long-term fiscal gap would 
rise to more than 3 percent, as noted in the table’s second row. 
In a sense, the true gap is this latter figure, with discretionary 
spending cuts presently projected to account for just under 
60 percent of the necessary adjustment.
D
B1999 1 r + ()








The remaining four rows in the table list the values of the 
long-run gap under four alternative policy scenarios. The first 
of these, in the third row, assumes enactment of the tax cut 
agreed to in conference by the House and Senate in the summer 
of 1999, and ultimately vetoed by President Clinton.9 Had the 
changes included in this legislation been adopted, the long-run 
gap would have nearly doubled. Indeed, given that the tax cut 
was specified through 2009, it might make sense to express the 
long-run gap under the assumption that no further action 
would be taken until fiscal year 2010. This delay, of course, 
would make the eventual adjustment larger on an annual basis, 
as the next row of the table shows.
The final two rows of the table present the results of a 
similar set of exercises for the proposals put forward in 
President Clinton’s fiscal year 2000 budget, presented to 
Congress in early 1999. This budget proposed a series of tax 
changes—including some tax increases but, overall, a net tax 
decrease—coupled with a range of increased spending. As the 
table shows, this plan, too, would have worsened the long-run 
gap, although by less than the Congressional plan.
The results of these calculations are sobering, given how 
much improved the current fiscal picture is relative to its 
condition just a few years ago. The long-run forecast, even 
assuming continued strength in federal tax revenues and a 
continuing decline in discretionary spending—each of which is 
subject to considerable debate—still embodies a large 
imbalance. To eliminate this imbalance would require 
significant further cuts in government spending or increases in 
tax revenues—budget tightening totally at odds with the 
proposals put forward this year by both parties and both 
branches of government.
Conclusions
Since 1974, the setting of U.S. fiscal policy has passed through 
several budget regimes, reflecting a series of attempts to control 
the large budget deficits that began in 1981. The composition 
and levels of federal taxes and expenditures have changed as a 
result of numerous policy changes, but also because of changes 
in the economy and even the international environment, which 
permitted the decline in defense spending that occurred. Now, 
and even more in the years to come, the federal budget will 
consist of transfer payments. By 2009—before the retirement of 
the baby-boom generation commences—Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid are projected to account for 60 percent 
of the federal budget, excluding interest.
Table 4





Discretionary spending constant at 1999
   share of GDP 3.17
Congressional Conference Agreement 2.47
Congressional Conference Agreement
   delays adjustment until 2010 2.98
Clinton plan 1.83
Clinton plan delays adjustment until 2010 2.21
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This shift from discretionary spending to age-based 
entitlement spending has important implications. First, it 
means that short-term deficits have become less and less useful 
as indicators of the longer term fiscal situation, because of the 
current budgetary approach of ignoring implicit federal 
commitments. Second, it suggests that the recent reliance on 
discretionary spending cuts to “make room” for ongoing 
entitlement growth may have reached the end of its 
effectiveness, as discretionary spending is approaching an 
historically low share of GDP. Third, as entitlement growth is 
driven by demographic and economic factors rather than by 
explicit legislation, it will require active program reductions, 
rather than simply legislative forbearance, to improve the 
current fiscal situation. With the increasing complexity of the 
tax system that has arisen under the regime of discretionary 
spending caps, one may hope that—under whatever the next 
budget process is—the distortions of the past approaches, as 
well as their successes, will be remembered. 22 Formation of Fiscal Policy 
Endnotes
1. This issue is discussed at greater length in Steuerle (1992).
2. There was also an income-based phase-out of the ability of 
taxpayers to deduct real estate losses.
3. Although the distinction is not always clear, these changes are 
meant to be those resulting from policy actions rather than from 
autonomous growth, an important distinction when considering the 
rapid growth of entitlement programs such as Medicare. Thus, a 
policy of continuous program cuts need not actually lead to declines 
in spending over time if there is an underlying trend in the opposite 
direction, as has been the case in health care spending. 
4. This finding is consistent with previous results, which typically have  
not distinguished between policy changes and other, autonomous 
changes in the budget. For example, Bohn (1998) finds that primary 
surpluses have responded to increases in debt-GDP ratios.
5. To account for the added net interest costs of reductions in the 
surplus relative to baseline, we use the three-month Treasury bill rate 
(U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1999b, p. 18).
6. This measure also excludes the U.S. Postal Service budget surplus, 
which is negligible by comparison.
7. The CBO undertakes a similar calculation by measuring the size of 
the immediate and permanent revenue increase or spending cut that 
would be necessary to result in a debt-to-GDP ratio in 2070 equal to 
today’s ratio. The cutoff at 2070 is arbitrary, however, and understates 
the magnitude of the long-term problem. This is because the primary 
deficits in the years after 2070 are projected to be larger than those of 
the typical year between now and 2070. Thus, including such years, 
which provides a more accurate and complete picture of the situation, 
also makes the situation appear worse.
8. The calculation based on the equation also requires a long-term 
discount factor (r) and a long-term GDP growth rate. For these, I use 
the ones constructed for a similar purpose by the Social Security Board 
of Trustees, taken from their 1999 annual report (Board of Trustees, 
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
1999, Table III.B.1).
9. Because the legislation did not specify any changes after fiscal year 
2009, the simulation takes the changes for the last full fiscal year 
specified and assumes them to be constant, relative to GDP, in the 
fiscal years after 2009.References
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